Attacks on Adoption Decrees by Natural Parents to Regain Custody by unknown
ATTACKS ON ADOPTION DECREES BY NATURAL PARENTS
TO REGAIN CUSTODY
POVERTY, sickness, illegitimacy, involuntary absence, and similar circum-
stances sometimes impel a parent to give up a child for adoption.1 The
adoption decree legally transfers to the adoptive parents all the natural parents'
rights to the child.2 But the decree itself does not assure the adoptive
parents that the child will be theirs permanently. Months or years later the
natural parents may have a change of heart. In practically every jurisdiction
they may challenge the decree, and, if successful, regain custody of the child.3
Attacks on adoption take two general forms: motions to vacate the decree4
and habeas corpus proceedings for custody of the child.5 In either proceeding
1. A prominent psychiatrist who has served as consultant for numerous New York
adoption agencies reports that "the real causes of a mother's surrendering her child are
never to be found in external circumstances such as poverty, sickness or illegitimacy
alone, but rather in her individual reactions to such environmental factors as part of
her total subjective and objective situation. A frequent inner reason for surrendering
the baby is the mother's feeling herself emotionally incapable of establishing or main-
taining a healthy, mature parent-child relationship. She may feel this way because of an
emotional instability or disturbance which pre-dates the birth of the child, and be less
able or willing to recognize or reveal such a reason for the surrender than the more
obvious and acceptable external hardships. In such instances later alleviation of the
original external circumstances would not necessarily alter the basic emotional problem
regarding the parental role." Communication to the YALE LAw, JOUmvAL from Dr. Viola
Bernard, dated Feb. 18, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library.
On the common adoptive practices in the 48 states see Comment, Moppets otn the
Market, 59 YALE L. J. 715 (1950). See also BRoors & Bnoos, ADMYNTUOrW nr Arop-
Tiox (1939) ; LEAv, I.Aw OF ADOi-0oN Snrurrnm (Legal Almanac Series No. 3, 1948);
4 VmmN, Am caxN FAaIILY Laws (1936).
2. See statutes compiled in BRooxs & Baooxs, ADvF.N-unING iN Am0mon 140-61
(1939).
3. See e.g., Lambert v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So2d 393 (1942) ; Strode v. Silver-
man, 209 S.W2d 415 (Texas Civ. App. 1948).
See Hauft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N.C. L. Rv. 127 (1941) for an enlightening
survey of the chaotic conditions in one state with respect to collateral attacks on adop-
tion decrees.
4. See, e.g. Lambert v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So. 2d 393 (1942) ; Nealon v. Farris,
131 S.W. 2d 858 (Mo. App. 1939); Strode v. Silverman, 209 S.M. 2d 415 (Texas Civ.
App. 1948).
5. See e.g., Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141 P.2d 976 (1943); Watt v. Dunn, 236
Iowa 67, 17 N.W2d 811 (1945) ; Brooks v. DeWitt, 178 SV2d 718 (Texas Civ. App.
1944). See generally, 1 FREnmAx, JuDGmENTs §§ 305, 352 (1925).
In addition to the types of attacks mentioned in the text, in eighteen jurisdictions an
adoption may be vacated by virtue of annulment statutes. The most common statutes
provide for annulment if the child develops feeblemindedness, epilepsy, insanity, or venereal
infection within five years of the adoption. Four states have no precise statutory pre-
requisites and simply give the court discretion to annul the decree. Five jurisdictions
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the decisive question is whether the court which rendered the decree had
jurisdiction. Hence courts apply identical criteria in both types of actions;
evidence which will cause an adoption to be vacated will also support a habeas
corpus proceeding., Thus, it is sufficient for the natural parent to prove that
he received no notice as required by statute 7 or by the Constitution,8 that
there was no abandonment of the child,9 or that consent was fraudulently
obtained.10 In some states the adoptive parents' failure to meet particular pro-
allow annulment because of misconduct of the adoptive parents, violation of the terms
of the adoption agreement, or because of the misconduct of the adopted child. 4 VEIuER,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 264 (1936).
See 5 ARx. STAT. ANN. § 56-110 for an example of a statute which permits anuul-
ment of adoptions because of the adoptive parents' unfitness.
6. Compare the cases cited at note 4 supra (motions to vacate), with those cited
at note 5 supra (habeas corpus). In the Strode case (motion to vacate), the court looked
to whether the parent had consented to the adoption, whether the child had been
abandoned, and whether there had been any service of process or notice. In the Nealon
case (motion to vacate), the court held that fraud in inducing the mother's consent was
a sufficient cause to vacate the adoption decree. The Lambert case (motion to vacate),
held the same.
In the Watt case (habeas corpus), the court held that fraud in obtaining the mother's
consent was good cause to hold the adoption decree void. In the Finn case (habeas
corpus), the court looked to the merits of the natural parent's claim, i.e. whether there
had been abandonment, notice or consent to the adoption. In the Brooks case (habeas
corpus), the court looked to the question of whether the natural parents had received
notice of the adoption proceedings and whether the child had been abandoned.
7. Approximately 11% of the 61 collateral attack cases reported since 1936 were
cases where the parent alleged that he received no notice of the adoption procedings.
E.g., In re Karns, 236 Iowa 932, 20 N.W.2d 474 (1945); Commonwealth cx rel. Sutton
v. Snyder, 56 D.&C. 669 (Pa. C.P. 1945) ; Grider v. Grider, 182 Tenn. 406, 187 S.W.2d 613
(1945).
8. Brooks v. DeWitt, S.W.2d 718 (Texas Civ. App. 1944).
9. If the natural parents have abandoned the child, formal consent to the adoption
is not required. See Note, Child Abandonment: The Botched Beginning of the Adoption
Process, 60 YALE L.J. 1240 (1951). In collateral proceedings to set aside an adoption,
the natural parents often claim that they did not actually abandon the child and that,
therefore, their consent should have been obtained. E.g., Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141
P.2d 976 (1943).
10. Fraud is the most common allegation. In over half of the 61 reported cases since
1936 the natural parents seeking to attack collaterally an adoption decree claimed at least
one count of fraud. For typical cases of the fraud allegation, see Arnold v. Howell, 98
Cal. App. 2d 202, 219 P.2d 854 (1950); Watt v. Dunn, 236 Iowa 67, 17 N.W2d 811
(1945); Falck v. Chadwick, 59 A.2d 187 (Md. Ct. App. 1948). See also 1 FREEMAN,
op. cit. supra note 5, § 331.
Fraud in this context means that the parent was misled, either by the adoptive parents
or by a third party, as to the consequences of his consent. In Arnold v. Howell, supra,
a father, called into the navy, consented to his child's adoption. He later claimed that
his consent was obtained on the representation that the child would be returned to him
when he came out of the service. The court held that the facts were sufficient to void
the adoption.
Where a mother's attorney obtained her consent by stating that the child would be
[Vol, 61
NOTES
cedural requirements of the adoption statute also renders the decree vulner-
able to attack."'
Because these attacks are based upon the original court's want of jurisdic-
tion, the scope of the later court's inquiry is limited to an examination of
technical compliance with adoption statutes. 2 But by deciding in this manner,
courts are likely to ignore the human interests at stake when an adoption
decree is voided or upheld. For example, court opinions seldom discuss the
possibility that the child and the adoptive parents have entered into a satisfy-
ing new family relationship, while the child and the natural parents may never
have formed any lasting attachuments. 13 Nor do courts often consider the
natural parent's real motives for attacking the adoption. The circumstances
existing when the child was given up may have changed,' 4 a parent may repent
a hastily given consent,1 an absent parent may return to find his child
adopted with or without consent, the fraud was sufficient to vacate the adoption decree.
Falck v. Chadwick, supra. An adoption decree was vacated where the mother thought
that her consent was a paper giving her child a name. Lambert v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 6S0,
8 So.2d 393 (1942); cf. In re Sipes, 24 Wash2d 603, 167 P2d 139 (1946) (mother
did not know what "adopting" meant; was told that she might still visit child). It was
held sufficient fraud to vacate the decree where the mother alleged that she thought her
consent would only permit the child to inherit from the adoptive parents. Barber v.
Barber, 20 Ky. 842, 134 SV.2d 933 (1939). But cf. Nealon v. Farris, 131 S.WV2d
858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (mother signed consent on her doctor's representation that her
disease was incurable. Held: insufficient fraud to vacate the adoption.). In no case
was motive or intent on the part of those parties committing the fraud given as a con-
trolling factor in the court's decision
11. Hoenshell v. Patterson, 225 P.2d 848 (Colo. 1950) (claim that child was not a
resident of county where decree was handed down) ; In re Bruce, 269 App. Div. 718, 53
N.Y.S.2d 502 (3d Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 702, 65 N.E.2d 336 (1946) (child did
not live with adoptive parents for the full statutory period before the decree vs
granted); Smith v. Curtis, 223 S.W.2d 712 (Texas Civ. App. 1949) (claim that cause
was set for hearing less than 40 days after mailing certified copy of petition to the
Department of Public Welfare as required by statute and clerk did not note the date of
this mailing on the docket).
12. Of 61 cases reported since 1936 only one case was discovered where the court's
decision was not controlled by a finding of a pre-adoption defect. Rhodes v. Lewis, 246
Ala. 241, 20 So.2d 206 (1944) (decision to be based on "best interest of child"). For
more typical treatment see In re Bruce, supra note 11. See also Strode v. Silverman, 209
SAV.2d 415 (Texas Civ. App. 1943).
13. The age at which the child was separated from his natural parents is seldom
considered. See Watt v. Dunn, 236 Iowa 67, 17 N.W2d 811 (1945); Nealon v. Farris,
131 S.W.2d 858 (Ito. Ct App. 1939); Adoption of Montgomery, 167 Pa. Super. 635,
76 A2d 240 (1950). Nor is the fact that the natural parent lived or closely associated
with the child after adoption considered. See Bottoms v. Carlz, 310 Mass. 29, 36 N.E2d
379 (1941).
14. See e.g. Nealon v. Farris, 131 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (parent con-
sented to the adoption while thinking she was incurably ill; illness later cured).
15. See e.g., In re Sipes, 24 Wash.2d 603, 167, P2d 139 (1946) (mother signed con-
sent without fully understanding the consequences of adoption).
1952]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
adopted, 16 or the parent's desire to get the child back may be a manifestation
of emotional instability.'
7
Removing a child from a successful adoptive home may cause hardship
both to the child and to the adoptive parents. Over half the children adopted
are illegitimate,18 and the majority are less than one year old when they
begin living with their new family.19 Generally such children come from
homes which were unwilling or unable to care for them. By contrast, adoptive
parents sought their child and demonstrated ability to care for him."0 More-
over, the emotional relationship of child and adoptive parent may be as good
as or better than the natural one, for this relationship depends not on biological
16. See e.g., In re Karns, 236 Iowa 932, 20 N.W.2d 474 (1945) (father returning
home after service in the armed forces discovered that his child had been adopted in the
interim).
17. Psychiatrists "find a high incidence of emotionally unsound reasons for attacking
the adoption decree; sometimes these motives are an extension of an emotional disturbance
involved in the parent's prior decision to surrender which, in turn, may have been re-
lated to her personality make-up prior to the child's birth. A change of mind as to keep-
ing the baby, if it occurs because of emotional instability, leads to non-optimum condi-
tions for the raising of the child. For example, an unmarried mother torn by conflicting
feelings and wishes, such as duty to the baby versus desire for peisonal freedom, may lack
the inner resources or opportunities for appropriate and effective guidance towards optimum
conflict-resolving at the stage of surrender. Instead of resolving conflicts then, she may
unwittingly perpetuate it by impulsively acting on first one and then the opposite side of
her conflict. She may surrender the baby in spite of strong guilt feelings at doing so,
and then seek to regain the child to assuage the guilt feelings. Recovering the baby,
however, may not have this effect, but rather intensify her resentment against it as a
burden. The difficult emotional and social experience of unmarried motherhood is so con-
ducive to painful personal conflict that changeability about decision to surrender is so
frequent as to be characteristic. When premature, impulsive or over-conflicted decision
to relinquish the baby occurs, the subsequent reverse desire to regain the baby is often
equally impulsive and emotionally unsound so that the parent and child suffer according-
ly." Communication to the YALE LAv JouENAL from Dr. Viola Bernard, dated Feb.
18, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library.
18. BRooKs & BROOxS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20. See Brown, Adoption of Children,
31 SocIoLoGIcAL Rsv. 44 (1939) for British statistics (seventy-nine per cent of children
adopted in London are illegitimate; sixty-six per cent for all of England and Wales).
19. A study of 2,414 adoptions in Minnesota revealed that the median age of the
children at placement was 8.10 months. Twenty-five per cent were 3.14 months or
younger, and only twenty-five per cent were 21.17 months or older when adopted. Of this
older group the median age was 31.83 months. Leahy, Some Characteristics of Adoptive
Parents, 38 Am. J. Soc. 548 (1933). See also CiiLD ADoPTiox RsEsRci% CoMmI~lrn, A
FoLLow Up STUDY OF ADopim FAIuEs (1951).
20. The adoptive home is generally superior to the average in economic status. The
proportion of adoptive fathers in professional, business, or managerial positions is three
to four times that of adult males in general. Adoptive parents are usually somewhat
older than true parents of children the same age with the majority between twenty-eight
and forty-five, and, they have been married approximately ten years. Less than one per
cent are unmarried. Leahy, supra note 19, at 548. See also Brown, supra note 18, at 44.
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ties but on the amount of healthy parental feeling the adult manifests.2
Vacating the adoption decree and uprooting the child from his new environ-
ment may create in him a host of psychological and emotional problems which
are accentuated because of his vulnerable age and his former upheaval. "2
On the other hand, not all adoptions are successful. Sometimes parent and
child reject each other,23 or an improper adoptive environment produces
emotional instability in the' child.24 Inadequate pre-adoption investigation
may result in placing the child with unfit parents,2 or a satisfactory adoptive
21. There is a popular misconception that natural mother love is the best kind. The
real determinant is the amount of healthy parental feeling an individual-whether natural
or adoptive parent-has, and this depends upon an individual's makeup and not upon
whether the child is natural. Communication to the YALE LAv, JOURNAL from Dr. Viola
Bernard, dated Feb. 18, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library.
The pioneer study in the field of foster relationships, THEis, How Fosma Cumu tr.
TtaRN OUT (N.Y. State Charities Aid Ass'n Pub. No. 165, 1924), investigated 910 chil-
dren placed in foster homes who were eighteen or over at the time the study was made.
Children placed when young were "almost invariably" accepted by the family as their
own children. Id. at 60. Only four per cent of the children placed when under five had
a wholly unsatisfactory relationship. Id. at 118. Where the children were adopted by
the foster parents, the study reports: "Of all the foster relationships the closest is
usually that existing between foster parents and children who have been legally adopted.
It most nearly resembles the natural tie between parents and children in understanding
and affection, indeed, it often seems a complete substitute for it." Id. at 119.
"[T]he fact of either blood relationship to persons shaping the environment or its
absence makes no difference. Adopted children, where presumably only environment
is operative, behave in a manner similar to own children vhere both heredity and
environment are operative." Leahy, Nature, Nurture, and Intelligence, 17 GnsrVric Psy-
cHoLoGY MoNoGRAPHS 299, No. 4 (1935). Such attributes as self-confidence, drive,
industry or their converse are not differently distributed in adoptive children, nor do
natural parents provide a more stimulating emotional environment than adoptive parents.
Id. at 291 (results based on emotional stability tests given to a group of over 200
adopted children and the same number of natural children). For other studies see those
cited in Brooks & Brooks, op. cit. supra note 1.
22. Clothier, Some Aspects of the Problem of Adoption, 9 Am. J. OnruoPscnmmv
598, 608 (1939). See also Kestenberg, Separation from Parents, 3 Nmv. CHn 20 (1943).
For an enlightening report of how a child may develop his love for the adoptive
parents when the adoption is successful see Clothier, supra at 612.
23. A study of 60 adopted children brought to a child guidance clinic because they
were "problems," revealed that the fault in 25 cases vas attributable to the adoptive
relationship. Either the child or the parent had rejected the other. Although the main
reason for such rejection w.-as aid to be improper reasons of the adoptive parents for
wanting a child, the study suggests that the same incidence of rejection may be found
in natural homes. In 25 cases the "problem" was not in any way connected with the
adoption. Epstein & Witmer, 4 Study of Sixty Adopted Problem Children, 8 SnrH
Con- STUiEs ix SoCIL. Voax 369 (1938).
24. For example, see the discussion in Towle, The Evaluation and Managemen-t of
Marital Situation in Foster Homes, 1 Am. J. ORTEOPSYCHIATRY 271 (1931) (foster en-
vironment detrimental to the child because of marital difficulties).
25. See Crutcher, Some Misplaced Children, 56 SUvP. 83 (1926); Comment,
Moppets on the Market, 59 YAE L.J. 715 (1950).
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home may later become unfit because of divorce, death, or other disruptive
factors.26 In addition, the facts of a case often reveal a strong equity in favor
of the natural parents although the adoption decree is technically flawless.
2 7
An enlightened approach to the problem of post-adoption conflict between
natural and adoptive parents is possible only if the court considers the best
interests of the child and the respective parents, rather than technicalities.
A court should, for example, try to discover the fitness of the respective
parents to have custody of the child. This determination would require re-
peated conferences with each set of parents, plus a judge with enough psycho-
logical training properly to evaluate the competing personalities. Further,
a court should ascertain whether the natural parent's original emotional or
circumstantial difficulties have been overcome. It should also compare the
child's position in the adoptive family with his would-be situation in his
natural home in terms of love, affection, and normal family relationship.
In making this comparison the court should look to such factors as the child's
age when adopted, the length of time since the adoption, the pre-adoption and
the post-adoption attachments formed by the child with his respective parents,
and the possibility of an adverse psychological reaction in the child if he were
re'moved from his present environment. The court should also examine the
parent's motive in attacking the adoption, the adoptive parents' reasons for
wanting to keep the child, the number of other children in each family and the
adopted child's adjustment to them.
28
26. See Epstein & Witmer, supra, note 23. Ten of the sixty adopted problem children
studied were emotionally insecure because of changes in the adoptive environment after
the decree.
27. For example, in Nealon v. Farris, 131 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) the court
refused to vacate an adoption decree where the mother had consented during an "in-
curable" illness and later regained her health. The court held that there was no fraud
against the mother when she was told that her illness was incurable. Absent other de-
fects in the adoption decree, it could not be vacated. The fact that the child had lived
with its real parents for a number of years before the adoption and the fact that the
mother sought to regain custody only a year after the adoption did not persuade the
court. The degree to which the child had become accustomed to the new environment
was scarcely considered.
See also Bottoms v. Carlz, 310 Mass. 29, 36 N.E.2d 379 (1941). A mother had per-
mitted close relatives to adopt her child while she continued to live with it in the
relative's home. Some years later, the mother married and wanted to take the child with
her. The court refused to vacate the adoption and did not even consider the fact that the
child in all probability knew and understood that the plaintiff was his real mother nor
the fact that the mother and child were in close daily association for a number of years.
28. The court's decision in these cases should depend upon the outcome of a very
intensive study of the parents involved and also the child himself. All the factors relative
to the home situation before the child was placed for adoption, the motivations of the
parents at that time, and an evaluation of their present situation and the motivations
which now prompt them to have the child returned to them should be included. Coin-
munication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Dr. George E. Gardner, Director, Judge
Baker Guidance Center, Boston, Mass., dated Jan. 2, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library.
Dr. Viola Bernard also stresses the fact that a thorough investigation of the adoptive
and natural parents and home should be made. Only when the adoptive home and
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The problem of establishing proper criteria for intelligent decisions when
adoptions are attacked is magnified by the inadequacy of present-day courts
as agencies for making the necessary determinations. The court's time and
personnel are generally much too limited for the thorough home and person-
ality investigations required. And even if time were available, few judges have
the training necessary to evaluate psychological data and form the proper con-
clusions therefrom. One solution is suggested by an experiment now being
conducted in the New York City Domestic Relations Court, where problems
concerning children are referred to a psychiatric board for evaluation and sug-
gestions.2 9 A second possible procedure is for the judge to seek aid from the
same sources available to him in an original adoption: either a qualified adop-
tion agency or the state public welfare agency. These agencies have trained
personnel to make the necessary home and personality investigations, and they
generally have access to psychiatric advice when required.,
parent-child relationship is poor should a court consider removing a child, since "a para-
mount cause of emotional handicaps and maladjustments in later life is the separation in
childhood from the home and parents that the child lmows, regardless of whether this
home be a natural home from which the child is separated through various vicissitudes,
or his original adoptive home." Communication to the YALE LAW JoURNAwLx from Dr.
Viola Bernard, dated February 18, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library.
The most recent study on adoption, CHILD AnoprioN RiszAn Cowmrirrm, A For.-
Low UP STuDY op AnmoprvE FAmLIS (1951), outlines the factors and method of
evaluating a home in terms of environment and personalities. The following criteria are
used: affection, admiration and criticism, ease or tension, patience and indulgence, freedom,
time spent with child by parents. Id. at 142-7. This rating scale system is based upon
casework observations, and requires a professional person vth special experience to do
the appraisal. Id. at 149. This system, however, is not infallible. Ibid.
29. This experiment is currently being conducted under a grant from the Russell
Sage Foundation.
30. For the role which these agencies play see LEAvY, op. d. mipra note 1, at 45, 61.
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